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SURPLUS SHARING WITH COHERENT UTILITY FUNCTIONS
DELIA COCULESCU AND FREDDY DELBAEN
Abstract. We use the theory of coherent measures to look at the problem of surplus
sharing in an insurance business. The surplus share of an insured is calculated by the
surplus premium in the contract. The theory of coherent risk measures and the resulting
capital allocation gives a way to divide the surplus between the insured and the capital
providers, i.e. the shareholders.
1. Notation and Motivation
In the present work we analyse a method to distribute the surplus of an insurance business
between the different agents taking part in the risk exchange. The insured pay premia to
an insurance company and in exchange of this, the company takes over the risks, i.e. the
company will pay out the claims that otherwise would have to be covered by the insured.
Besides these two players, there is also the supervision or the regulator. The task of the
regulator is to make sure that the insurance business is fair. That means for instance that
all companies play with the same rules so that competition can take place. The regulator
must also see whether the companies have enough capital to cover the risks since otherwise
– in case of bankruptcy – a substantial portion of the risk would be transferred to society,
i.e. to the tax payers or to other economic agents.
As already pointed out by Deprez and Gerber [7], insurance premia should be dependent
on the whole portfolio of insurance contracts. That would mean that the premium to be
charged for a contract can only be calculated when all other contracts (signed or in the
“pipeline”) are known. In practice this is impossible and hence premia are charged that are
certainly higher than the fair allocation of the total premium to the individual contracts.
The result is that the extra part must be seen as a contribution to the capital of the company
and hence is entitled to a share in the eventual surplus.
In the present document we will deal with a way to calculate the share of each economic
agent, be it the capital providers or shareholders or the insured through their extra premium.
The problem on how to fix the total amount of regulatory capital is the subject of joint
ongoing work, which was initiated by Artzner and Eisele [1].
We also restrict our analysis to a one period model. The surplus share is particularly
important for life insurance contracts and handling these would necessitate a multi-period
setup. The technical and conceptual problems are not easy so we “postponed” it to further
research.
We will use the language of probability theory as is usually done in financial and actuarial
mathematics. We will fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) on which all random variables will be
defined. In particular the claims will be seen as random variables defined on this probability
space. For simplicity we will only work with bounded random variables. The vector space
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of bounded random variables is denoted by L∞(Ω,F ,P) or simply L∞. The restriction to
bounded random variables facilitates the modelling since we do not have to make assumptions
on integrability, big tails, and so on. However it triggers some extra mathematical problems.
The solution of these problems will only be sketched and for more details we refer to [3] and
[4]. We assume that the insurance company takes decisions using a coherent utility function.
Definition 1. A mapping u : L∞ → R is called a monetary utility function if the following
properties hold
(1) if 0 ≤ ξ ∈ L∞ then u(ξ) ≥ 0,
(2) u is concave i.e. for all ξ, η ∈ L∞, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 we have u(λξ + (1 − λ)η) ≥ λu(ξ) +
(1− λ)u(η),
(3) for a ∈ R and ξ ∈ L∞, u(ξ + a) = u(ξ) + a
(4) if ξn ↓ ξ then u(ξn)→ u(ξ).
If moreover for all 0 ≤ λ ∈ R, u(λξ) = λu(ξ), we call u coherent.
The number u(ξ) can be seen as a risk adjusted valuation of the future uncertain position
ξ. Property (1) in the definition is therefore clear. Risk averseness is usually translated
by concavity properties and it is believed that combinations are less risky than individual
positions. This explains property (2). Property (3) means that risk adjusted valuations are
measured in money units. Of course money today (date of the valuation) is different from
money at the end of the period. Introducing a deflator or discounting – as is the practice in
actuarial business since hundreds of years – solves this problem. It complicates notation and
as long as there is only one currency involved it does not lead to confusion if one supposes
that this discounting is already incorporated in the variables. The fourth property is a
continuity property. Using monotonicity (a consequence of the previous properties, see [4]),
we can also require that u(ξn) ↓ u(ξ). In this text we will use the more stronger property
where ↓’s are replaced by ↑’s, see [4]. This avoids some mathematical problems that are easily
overcome but they obscure the philosophy of the approach. The homogeneity property is a
strong property. In a later paragraph where we use commonotonicity, positive homogeneity
is already satisfied.
Sometimes the value u(ξ) only depends on the distribution or law of the random variable
ξ. In this case we say “law invariant”, “law determined”, ... An example of such a mapping is
the distorted probability. These were introduced in insurance by Yaari, [11] and Denneberg
[6]. They were later used by Wang [10]. An example of such a utility function is (for ξ ≥ 0)
the Choquet integral
∫∞
0
f(P[ξ > t]) dt where f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is convex, f(0) = 0, f(1) =
1. See [4], [8], [9], [2] for more details and for the relations between convex games and
commonotonicity.
We say that a random variable ξ is acceptable if u(ξ) ≥ 0. Remark that ξ−u(ξ) is always
acceptable. If u is coherent then the acceptability set A = {ξ | u(ξ) ≥ 0} is a convex cone.
The continuity assumption allows to apply convex duality theory and leads to the following
representation theorem
Theorem 1. If u is coherent there exists a convex closed set S ⊂ L1, consisting of probability
measures, absolutely continuous with respect to P, such that for all ξ ∈ L∞:
u(ξ) = inf
Q∈S
EQ[ξ].
Conversely each such a set S defines a coherent utility function.
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Remark 1. We identify an absolutely continuous probability measure Q≪ P with its Radon-
Nikodym derivative dQ
dP
.
Remark 2. Replacing the true or physical probability P by other measures is a practice that
is well known in insurance. Standard techniques that can be described are e.g “tilting” and
increasing or decreasing ages in life insurance contracts. To calculate premia, more weight
is then given to unfavourable events and favourable events get less weight. The existence of
such a set S says that the change in probability is done in a systematic and consistent way.
Remark 3. We can show that the upward sequential continuity in the definition of coherent
utility functions is equivalent to the existence of a minimizer Q0 ∈ S. This equivalence
follows from a deep mathematical result in functional analysis (theorem of R. James), [4].
That the inf can be replaced by min simplifies some of the proofs. We call this property the
weak compactness property of S.
Definition 2. We say that two random variables ξ, η are commonotonic if there exist a
random variable ζ as well as two non-decreasing functions f, g : R → R such that ξ = f(ζ)
and η = g(ζ).
Remark 4. It is a non-trivial exercise to show that we can always take ζ = ξ + η.
Definition 3. We say that u : L∞ → R is commonotonic if for each couple ξ, η of commono-
tonic random variables we have u(ξ + η) = u(ξ) + u(η).
Remark 5. Commonotonic concave monetary utility functions are positively homogeneous
and hence coherent. In general coherent utility functions satisfy u(ξ+η) ≥ u(ξ)+u(η). That
means that by diversifying, the risk adjusted valuation gets better. Commonotonic random
variables form the opposite of diversification. Roughly speaking: what is worse for ξ is worse
for η. The commonotonicity of u can therefore be seen as a translation of the rule: if there
is no diversification, there is also no gain in putting these claims together.
2. Description of the Model
We use the following setup. There are N agents to be insured, indexed i = 1, . . . , N .
There is one insurer denoted by the index 0. There is also a “super”-reinsurer whose role
will be explained later. He will be denoted by r. The agents have liabilities that they want to
insure. The liability for agent i is Xi ≥ 0. Without insurance her position will be −Xi. There
are different premium principles which will be described in the examples below. The utility
functions of the agents are denoted by ui. The coherent utility function of the insurer is u0
and to reduce complexity, supposed to be commonotonic. The utility functions of the agents
are more restrictive than the insurer’s utility function u0. Meaning: when a random variable
is not acceptable for the insurer, then it is not acceptable for the agents. Equivalently we
can say that acceptable elements for the agent i are acceptable for the insurer. This is a
translation of the fact that the agent i feels a need for insurance and that an insurer can fill
in these needs. Because of the translation property we then have for all ξ and all i ≥ 1:
u0(ξ) ≥ ui(ξ).
The insurer also brings in an initial capital k0. He will take the insurance only if he can
obtain a better outcome. Because u0 is coherent the total premium, pi0, must be at least
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pi0 = −u0
(
−
∑N
i=1Xi
)
. Indeed, the insurer takes the random variable −
∑
iXi and receives
pi0. The deal is only acceptable for the insurer if u0(pi0 −
∑
iXi) ≥ 0. We suppose that the
scenario set for u0, S0 is weakly compact so that there is a Q0 ∈ S0 such that
EQ0
[
N∑
i=1
Xi
]
= sup
Q∈S0
EQ
[
N∑
i=1
Xi
]
= −u0
(
−
N∑
i=1
Xi
)
.
In case u0 is commonotonic, we can (and shall) even chooseQ0 so that for all Y commonotonic
with
∑
iXi and such that the distribution of Y has no other points of increase as
∑
iXi,
we have u0(Y ) = EQ0 [Y ]. This applies for cases such as Y = min(R,
∑
iXi) or Y =
(
∑
iXi − R)
+), where R ∈ R.
From [3], [4] using the capital allocation principle we find that the individual “fair” premia
should be
(1) pii = EQ0 [Xi].
In [3] and [4] it is shown that the allocation principle can also be obtained as an application
of the marginal contribution of one agent. The latter was the approach given in [7]. The
equivalence requires some technical assumptions that go beyond the scope of this paper.
What it means is that under these extra assumptions we have
pii = lim
ε↓0
(−1)
u0(−
∑
j Xj − εXi)− u0(−
∑
j Xj)
ε
The equality pii = EQ0 [Xi] immediately implies
−pii = EQ0 [−Xi] ≥ u0(−Xi) ≥ ui(−Xi).
For the agent i this is a good deal, provided that the insurance pays entirely the claim Xi
at date 1, since −pii ≥ ui(−Xi). What she pays for insurance is better than paying Xi.
In the following, we propose four different models, that is, four different ways in which
the premia can be fixed by the insurer in situations where there is either a government
guarantee, or a reinsurance possibility. There is a distinction between the fair premia and
what is actually charged, which may be higher. We argue that the difference should be
regarded as a participation to the capital by the insured agents, and be remunerated by a
share of the surplus. We provide conditions that the deals are acceptable by all agents and
the insurer. More precisely, we consider that a deal is acceptable for the insurer whenever
the utility u0 of the profit received by the insurer exceeds k0. We say that the deal is
acceptable for agent i whenever the insurance deal generates an increase in agent’s utility
ui, as compared with the situation without insurance.
3. Model 1
In this example we suppose that the insurer has limited liability. We take for the total
premium pi0 = −u0
(
−
∑N
i=1Xi
)
. We distinguish several cases:
(1)
∑
iXi > pi0 + k0. In this case the total claim size exceeds the available capital. The
excess is supposed to be covered by for instance the government and this at no cost.
The initial capital should then be sufficiently high to make the deal acceptable for
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the government. The determination of this level is beyond the contents of this paper.
We denote by A the set A = {
∑
iXi > pi0 + k0}.
(2) pi0 ≤
∑
iXi ≤ pi0 + k0. In this case there is no surplus and the insurer will lose part
of his investment. We denote by B the set B = {pi0 ≤
∑
iXi ≤ pi0 + k0}.
(3) pi0 >
∑
iXi. In this case there is a surplus. The insurer will keep the surplus entirely.
This can be defended since the agents already “gained” from the allocation principle
which is their share when entering the insurance. Also they do not take any risk. We
denote by C the set C = {pi0 >
∑
iXi}.
Theorem 2. The deal is acceptable for the insurer.
Proof The insurer will accept the deal if
u0(1B∪C(pi0 + k0 −
∑
i
Xi)) ≥ k0.
This is easily proved. By definition of pi0, we have u0(pi0−
∑
iXi) = 0, hence u0(pi0−
∑
iXi+
k0) = k0, therefore by monotonicity u0 ((pi0 −
∑
iXi + k0)
+) ≥ k0. 
Remark 6. We remark that there must be a regulator who requires a minimum capital k0.
Otherwise the company would choose k0 = 0, take the profit on the event C and leave
the trouble to “society” on the event A. As said in the introduction, the rules used by the
regulators and the implementation in models is the topic of research with Artzner and Eisele.
4. Model 2
This is almost the same as example 1, but this time we require a premium for covering the
excess. We also assume that the reinsurer has no default. The reinsurance premium will be
calculated by the same coherent utility function, i.e. the same set S0. It is here that we use
the commonotonicity. The retention will be denoted by R and this results in the splitting:
∑
i
Xi =
(∑
i
Xi
)
∧R +
(∑
i
Xi − R
)+
.
The two terms are commonotonic and hence the premium satisfies
pi0 = pi
R + ρR; piR = EQ0
[(∑
i
Xi
)
∧R
]
; ρR = EQ0
[(∑
i
Xi −R
)+]
.
The retention level needs to be chosen so that the claims are fully covered, that is, the
available funds (given by k0 + pi
R) are not below the retention level. We define the optimal
retention R as the maximal retention level that results in a full coverage of the claims:
R := max{x | x ≤ k0 + pi
R}.
The existence and uniqueness of R follows from an easy analysis of the function Φ defined
as
R+ → R+; x→ x− EQ0
[(∑
i
Xi
)
∧ x
]
.
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As x − EQ0 [(
∑
iXi) ∧ x] = EQ0
[
(x−
∑
iXi)
+] = ∫ x
0
Q0 (
∑
iXi ≤ a) da, the function Φ(x)
is continuous, convex, strictly increasing after it leaves zero, is 0 at 0 and tends to ∞ for
x→ +∞.
Hence, the optimal retention R satisfies:
R = k0 + pi
R,
that is, the available capital is R, which is also the maximum the insurer has to pay out.
The surplus is therefore
R −
(∑
i
Xi
)
∧R.
The agents again do not take any risk and hence they should not participate in the surplus.
The insurer finds it a good deal if
u0
(
R−
(∑
i
Xi
)
∧ R
)
≥ k0.
But the definition of R shows that u0 (R − (
∑
iXi) ∧ R) = k0. That means there is no
incentive to do business and the insurer must get all the profit to have an equivalent outcome.
5. Model 3
This is an extension of the previous models. The agents pay a premium equal to pi ≥ pii,
where pii is the fair premium, introduced in (1). This has the advantage that the insurer can
announce the premium without having to calculate the total premium necessary to cover
the total losses. Of course this procedure should lead to a premium greater than the fair
premium as calculated in the previous models. An example of such a premium calculation
could be the amount supQ∈S0 EQ[Xi] = −u0(−Xi). The extra premium pi − pii can be seen
as a contribution of agent i to the capital, hence agents should be entitled to a share in the
surplus. All investors must be treated in the same way and hence the share of agent i is
proportional to her contribution, namely pi−pii∑
j(pj−pij)+k0
. The investor will get a proportion
k0∑
j(pj−pij)+k0
. These fractions are paid out regardless of having caused a claim or not.
The retention is now defined by the relation∑
i
(pi − pii) + k0 + pi
R = R.
The existence and uniqueness of R are proved in the same way. This time we must see
whether this is a good deal for the insurer as well as for the agents.
Theorem 3. The deal is acceptable for the insurer.
Proof For the insurer we must check the inequality
u0
(
k0
k0 +
∑
i (pi − pii)
(
R−
∑
i
Xi
)+)
≥ k0.
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By positive homogeneity of u0 this is the same as:
u0
(
R −
(∑
i
Xi
)+)
≥ k0 +
∑
i
(pi − pii) .
As in the previous example this follows from the definition of R which implies:
u0
(
R −
(∑
i
Xi
)
∧R
)
= R− piR = k0 +
∑
i
(pi − pii) .

Theorem 4. The deal is acceptable for the insured as soon as pi ≤ supQ∈S0 EQ[Xi].
Proof For agent i we must check:
ui
(
−pi +
pi − pii
k0 +
∑
j (pj − pij)
(
R−
∑
i
Xi
)+)
≥ ui (−Xi) .
This is equivalent to
ui
(
pi − pii
k0 +
∑
j (pj − pij)
(
R−
∑
i
Xi
)+)
≥ ui (pi −Xi) .
The left hand side is positive whereas the right hand side is negative provided the premium
pi is not too big. For instance if pi ≤ supQ∈S0 EQ[Xi] we have u0 (pi −Xi) ≤ 0 and hence
also ui (pi −Xi) ≤ 0. 
Remark 7. In any case the agent i will not pay a premium pi that is bigger than −ui(−Xi).
Paying a higher premium and counting on surplus participation is not realistic since the
surplus share also depends on the claims incurred through the other agents.
6. Model 4
We continue the building of stepwise more complicated models. We suppose that there
are two insurers. The first one has a utility function u0, described by the scenario set S0.
This insurer acts as the direct insurer. The second insurer acts as a reinsurer with utility
function ur described by the scenario-set Sr. For a claim 0 ≤ ξ, the reinsurer would charge
a premium supQ∈Sr EQ[ξ].
Both utility functions u0 and ur are supposed to be commonotone. Their scenario-sets
are therefore determined as cores of convex games, say v0 ≥ vr. For simplicity we suppose
that both scenario-sets S0,Sr are weakly compact. We can therefore suppose that there are
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elements Q0 ∈ S0,Qr ∈ Sr such that for all a:
sup
Q∈Sr
EQ
[∑
j
Xj
]
= EQr
[∑
j
Xj
]
sup
Q∈Sr
EQ
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ a
]
= EQr
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ a
]
sup
Q∈Sr
EQ
[(∑
j
Xj − a
)+]
= EQr
[(∑
j
Xj − a
)+]
sup
Q∈S0
EQ
[∑
j
Xj
]
= EQ0
[∑
j
Xj
]
sup
Q∈S0
EQ
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ a
]
= EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ a
]
sup
Q∈S0
EQ
[(∑
j
Xj − a
)+]
= EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj − a
)+]
.
The reinsurer is supposed to be default free (it could be a government institution or a
solidarity fund of the insurance industry). We suppose that the agents have access to this
reinsurer. We assume that ui ≤ ur ≤ u0 for all i, or what is the same S0 ⊂ Sr ⊂ Si. This
reflects the fact that on one hand the agents are more risk adverse than the insurers, and on
the other hand the reinsurer being default free, the premia for the reinsurer are higher than
for the direct insurer.
The actions of the direct insurer are subject to the rule that after reinsurance, the claims
must be covered completely. The direct insurer will therefore take a reinsurance with a
retention R, to be determined later. For the retention level R, the cost of the reinsurance is
given by (using the commonitonicity of ur):
ρR := −ur
(
−
(∑
j
Xj − R
)+)
= EQr
[(∑
j
Xj − R
)+]
.
To get full coverage of their risks without input of any capital (that is, k0 = R = 0), the
agents should pay a total premium
ρ0 = −ur
(
−
∑
j
Xj
)
= EQr
[∑
j
Xj
]
,
as the direct insurer can transfer the totality of the claims to the reinsurer at the cost ρ0.
Using the capital allocation principle, we deduce that the premium for such a coverage to
be paid by agent j is
pirj := EQr [Xj] .
For the moment we consider the amounts pirj as the premium-input of the agent j; if they
pay higher premia, pj, the differences, pj − pi
r
j , are regarded as capital-input. In practice
however, the direct insurer brings in a capital k0 > 0 (again, we consider this being fixed by
8
a regulator), and hence the retention R will not be zero. This means that whenever R > 0,
the premia pirj that we are considering are not exactly the fair premia (see also Remark 8
below).
As the insurer participates with a capital k0, we must determine the retention level R; as
before we consider R to be the maximal retention level that results in a full coverage. The
full coverage condition is now given by: R ≤ k0 +
∑
j pj − ρ
R, so that the optimal retention
is:
R = max{x | x ≤ k0 +
∑
j
pj − ρ
R}.
The full coverage condition can be written as: R−EQr
[(∑
j Xj
)
∧R
]
≤ k0 +
∑
j(pj − pi
r
j ).
Therefore, the existence and unicity of optimal retention comes using identical arguments as
before for Φ, but this time for the function Ψ defined as:
R+ → R+; x→ x− EQr
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ x
]
.
From now on, we always assume R to be the optimal retention, that is: R = k0+
∑
j pj−ρ
R,
or, alternatively:
Ψ(R) = k0 +
∑
j
(pj − pi
r
j ).
In Remark 9 we analyse the dependence of the optimal reserve on the level of the capital.
With the capital input of the insurer being k0 and the retention level R, the outcome (i.e.,
surplus) at the end of the contract is
S := k0 +
∑
j
pj − ρ
R −
(∑
j
Xj
)
∧R ≥ 0.
We denote by λ0 =
k0
k0+
∑
j(pj−pi
r
j
)
the proportion of the surplus that the direct insurer is
keeping and by λi =
pi−pi
r
i
k0+
∑
j(pj−pi
r
j
)
the proportion of the surplus that agent i is keeping.
We now prove that this procedure of surplus sharing is beneficial for the insurer and for
the insured. Let us fist check the utility for the direct insurer.
Theorem 5. The deal is acceptable for the direct insurer.
Proof For the direct insurer, the deal is acceptable if and only if the utility of his share
of the surplus is not less that k0, that is u0(λ0S) ≥ k0. The utility of his share is given by
u0(λ0S) = λ0
(
k0 +
∑
j
pj − ρ
R − EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ R
])
.
This quantity is bigger than k0 if and only if
−EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧R
]
−EQr
[(∑
j
Xj −R
)+]
≥
∑
j
(−pirj ) = −EQr
[∑
j
Xj
]
= ur
(
−
∑
j
Xj
)
.
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The utility functions u0 and ur are commonotone and therefore we have that
u0
(
−
(∑
j
Xj
)
∧R
)
= −EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ R
]
ur
(
−
(∑
j
Xj − R
)+)
= −EQr
[(∑
j
Xj − R
)+]
.
Therefore the inequality is obvious, given u0 ≥ ur. 
Theorem 6. The deal is acceptable for the insured as soon as pi ≤ supQ∈Sr EQ[Xi].
Proof To check the advantage for the insured i, we must show that ui(λiS − pi) ≥
ui(−Xi), that is:
λiui(S) ≥ pi + ui(−Xi)
The surplus being nonnegative, the left hand side is nonnegative. The right side is nega-
tive provided the premium pi is not too big. For instance if pi ≤ supQ∈Sr EQ[Xi] we have
ur (pi −Xi) ≤ 0 and hence also ui (pi −Xi) ≤ 0. 
Remark 8. For each agent, the cost pi was split in two parts: premium-input pi
r
i and capital-
input pi − pi
r
i , with all premia-input summing up to EQr [
∑
j Xj] = −ur
(
−
∑
j Xj
)
. This is
higher than the total required premium, which should be the cost of the reinsurance contract
plus the cost of the direct insurance of the claims up to the retention level, given as:
−ur
(
−
(∑
j
Xj − R
)+)
− u0
(
−
(∑
j
Xj
)
∧R
)
= EQr
[(∑
j
Xj −R
)+]
+ EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧R
]
.
Indeed, from our assumptions on the utility functions, we have
EQr
[(∑
j
Xj − R
)+]
+ EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ R
]
≤ EQr
[∑
j
Xj
]
.
Probably a more fair way to split the cost pi is to consider
pii = EQr
[
Xi1{
∑
j Xj>R}
]
+ EQ0
[
Xi1{
∑
j Xj≤R}
]
as being the premium-input of agent i, and the remaining pi − pii as being the capital-input
of agent i (provided this is positive). This different way of splitting the cost does not affect
(of course) the way to compute the optimal retention level, nor the surplus S available
after payment of all claims. It is only meant to provide an alternative rule for sharing the
surplus: now k0
k0+
∑
j(pj−pij)
is the proportion of the surplus that the direct insurer is keeping
and pi−pii
k0+
∑
j(pj−pij)
the proportion of the surplus that agent i is keeping. Nevertheless, for such
allocations of the surplus, we did not find a simple condition for the premia pi that ensures
that the deals are acceptable for the agents, while respecting pi ≥ pii. By a simple rule, we
mean a condition on all pi that does not involve agent’s utility directly.
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But the reader can easily check that for the direct insurer any allocation among the insured
agents of the quantity EQr
[(∑
j Xj −R
)+]
+ EQ0
[(∑
j Xj
)
∧ R
]
leaves the insurer with
an outcome that in u0 utility is equivalent to the initial capital k0. This is even independent
of the retention limit.
Remark 9. We will now show that with increasing capital k0, the utility for the direct insurer
goes up. Let us denote by R(k0) the solution of
R− EQr
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ R
]
= k0 +
∑
j
(pj − pi
r
j ).
We recall that the function Ψ(R) = R − EQr
[(∑
j Xj
)
∧R
]
satisfies Ψ(0) = 0 and is
continuous with Ψ′(R) = Q
(∑
j Xj ≤ R
)
. Hence, it is strictly increasing after it leaves zero
and tends to ∞ when R tends to ∞. Also, it is convex. These properties ensure that Ψ−1
is well defined on (0,∞) and is continuous, strictly increasing and concave.
Also, we recall that we consider that all pj ≥ pi
r
j so that
∑
j(pj−pi
r
j ) ≥ 0. We can consider
k0 > 0, to ensure positivity of the quantity k0 +
∑
j(pj − pi
r
j ). The implicit function theorem
then shows that dR
dk0
≥ 0.
The utility of the insurer’s share of the surplus u0(λ0S) can be written as:
λ0
(
k0 +
∑
j
pj − EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ R
]
− EQr
[(∑
j
Xj − R
)+])
=
k0
k0 +
∑
j(pj − pi
r
j )
(
k0 +
∑
j
(pj − pi
r
j )− EQr
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ R
]
− EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ R
])
=
k0
k0 +
∑
j(pj − pi
r
j )
(
R− EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧ R
])
=
k0
k0 +
∑
j(pj − pi
r
j )
EQ0
[(
R−
∑
j
Xj
)+]
.
The first factor is clearly increasing in k0 and the second factor is increasing in R, hence also
in k0.
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More important is the difference between this utility and the initial capital k0:
u0(λ0S)− k0 =
k0
k0 +
∑
j(pj − pi
r
j )
(
R − EQ0
[(∑
j
Xj
)
∧R
])
− k0
= k0

 R− EQ0
[(∑
j Xj
)
∧ R
]
k0 +
∑
j pj − EQr
[∑
j Xj
] − 1


= k0

EQr
[(∑
j Xj
)
∧ R
]
− EQ0
[(∑
j Xj
)
∧ R
]
k0 +
∑
j pj − EQr
[∑
j Xj
]

 .
This shows that when k0 → ∞ the extra return tends to EQr
[∑
j Xj
]
− EQ0
[∑
j Xj
]
, but
also shows that the return on the initial capital tends to zero.
7. Discussion of the models
There are different shortcomings of the models used. The premia paid by the agents are
augmented by the administration or handling costs. Here we might argue that in case of a
claim, the agents incur these costs themselves. In the handling costs there is also included
the commission paid out to the intermediaries, the brokers. These commissions should not
be too high since otherwise the agents could keep their liabilities or take insurance only for
the larger part of the claims, the so called tail of the distribution.
The utility functions of the agents cannot be supposed to be positively homogeneous. they
should be concave. However if commonotonicity is used we must suppose that the utility
functions are positively homogeneous as this is a consequence of commonotonicity, [4]. We
only needed commonotonicity for the utility function of the insurer and the reinsurer. The
inequalities ui ≤ ur ≤ u0 can be verified in case u0 and ur are positively homogeneous
and ui is only concave. However the inequality implies some geometric restrictions on the
acceptability set of agent i. For instance the function ui cannot be differentiable at 0 ∈ L
∞.
We supposed the presence of a reinsurer who is default free. In some cases a government
can provide a guarantee but in general we must include the possibility of default of the
reinsurer. Some countries require guarantees from the reinsurer either under the form of
deposits or under the form of letters of credit issued by “bona fide” financial institutions.
In case of liability insurance there might be a rule that in case of default of the insurer
and of the reinsurer, the agent is not liable for the remaining losses. Especially in high end
insurance contracts such rules and exceptions make the modelling extremely difficult.
In our models there is a reward for those who take the risk. This is in contradiction with
some life insurance practice where only the amount of the total premium is important.
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